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BUSTING THE HART & WECHSLER 
PARADIGM 
Michael Wells* 
Federal Courts law was once a vibrant area of scholarship 
and an essential course for intellectually ambitious students. 
Now its prestige has diminished so much that scholars debate its 
future in a recent issue of the Vanderbilt Law Review, where even 
one of its champions calls it (albeit in the subjunctive mood) a 
"scholarly backwater."l What, if anything, went wrong, and what 
should Federal Courts scholars do about it? In his contribution to 
the Vanderbilt symposium, Richard Fallon defends the reigning 
model of Federal Courts law, an approach to jurisdictional issues 
that dates from the publication in 1953 of Henry Hart and Her-
bert Wechsler's casebook, The Federal Courts and the Federal 
System.z In Fallon's view, nothing went wrong, and in any event 
there is not much we can do about it. In brief, Fallon argues that 
with a few adjustments, Federal Courts scholars should continue 
to work within the model set out by Hart & Wechsler forty years 
ago, a model that rests upon "the principles and policies underly-
ing federalism and the separation of powers,''3 and such process 
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1. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 Vand. 
L. Rev. 953,976 (1994) ("Reflections") ("If Federal Courts is a scholarly backwater it is a 
backwater with an important place in the ecosystem of public law scholanhip. ") The 
other contributon to the issue are Ann Althouse, Late Night Confessions in the Hart & 
Wechsler Hotel, 47 Vand. L Rev. 993 (1994), and Judith Resnik, Rereading "The Federal 
Courts": Revising the Domain of Federal Courts Jurisprudence at the End of the Twentieth 
Century, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1021 (1994). The papen were originally delivered at the pro-
gram of the Federal Courts Section of the American Association of Law Schools in Janu-
ary, 1994. 
The restless mood of Federal Courts scholan is reflected in Professor Althouse's 
paper, where she comments that at her school (Wisconsin) "nobody else has given a hoot 
about teaching Federal Courts for nearly ten yean," and that as a Federal Courts scholar 
"you feel more and more marginalized." Althouse, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 997. 
2. Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Herbert Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal 
System (Foundation Press, 1953). The book is now in its third edition. Paul M. Bator, et 
al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System (Foundation Press, 3rd 
ed. 1988). 
3. ld. at 965. 
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values as "reasoned elaboration of principles and policies that 
are ultimately traceable to more democratically legitimate deci-
sionmakers"4 and the obligation that judges "be principled in 
their reasoning. "s He suggests that although the rise of interdis-
ciplinary studies has overshadowed the process-based methodol-
ogy that characterizes most Federal Courts teaching and 
scholarship, the traditional approach to Federal Courts still has 
much to offer. In any event, Fallon suggests, there is no good 
alternative available for the study of the allocation issues that 
make up the Federal Courts field.6 
In this article I argue that the "Hart & Wechsler paradigm" 
(as Fallon calls their model)' no longer serves us well either as an 
account of what the Supreme Court does in Federal Courts cases 
or as a guide to what the Court ought to do. In its place, I pro-
pose a new, more fruitful model for analyzing the normative is-
sues that arise in Federal Courts cases. I call it the "pragmatic 
paradigm," because its central feature is the pragmatist precept 
that no value should be taken as foundational, be it process, fed-
eralism, or separation of powers. Rather, the force of any of 
these values in a given case depends on the arguments that can 
be mustered in their support, and those arguments will vary in 
strength depending on context. 
I. THE HART & WECHSLER PARADIGM 
Hart & Wechsler's casebook contains no explicit model of 
Federal Courts Law. Even so, Fallon is right to discern a para-
digm in the materials, in contemporaneous writings by the book's 
authors, and in the scholarly tradition they spawned. Fallon 
notes that "the central, organizing question of Federal Courts 
doctrine involves allocations of authority: Who ought to have au-
thority to give conclusive determinations of which kinds of ques-
tions?"s The insight linking allocation issues is that "authority to 
decide must at least sometimes include authority to decide 
wrongly ... Once [this] point is recognized, it becomes evident 
that constitutional federalism and the separation of powers can 
4. ld. at 966. 
5. ld. at 966. 
6. Reflections at 971-72 (cited in note 1 ). 
7. Fallon borrows the term "paradigm" from Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions (U. of Chi. Press, 2d ed. 1970), where it is used to signify "a set of 
assumptions that defines both a series of problems worth solving and .a fr~mework ~t~in 
which answers to those problems can be sought." Reflections at 955 (ctted m note 1) cttmg 
T. Kuhn, supra, at 23-51. 
8. Reflections at 962 (cited in note 1). 
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be illuminated by painstaking attention to the question of where 
ultimate responsibility for certain kinds of questions, including 
the power to make uncorrectable mistakes, should lie. "9 
In addressing allocation issues, Hart & Wechsler employed 
six methodological assumptions. These include: 
(1) "The principle of institutional settlement," which 
holds "that decisions which are the duly arrived at result of duly 
established procedures for making decisions of this kind ought to 
be accepted as binding on the whole society unless and until they 
are duly changed."to 
(2) "The anti-positivist principle," that allocation deci-
sions must be understood "as a rich, fluid, and evolving set of 
norms for effective governance and dispute resolution, not as a 
positivist system of fixed and determinate rules."n 
(3) "The principle of structural interpretation," which 
provides that "[i]n disputes about the proper allocation of deci-
sion-making authority, the principles and policies underlying fed-
eralism and the separation of powers deserve special weight. "12 
(4) "The principle of the rule of law," which implies 
that "the courts have irreducible functions" and "requires the 
availability of judicial remedies sufficient to vindicate fundamen-
tal legal principles."t3 
(5) "The principle of reasoned elaboration," that judi-
cial creativity is constrained by "the reasoned elaboration of 
principles and policies that are ultimately traceable to more dem-
ocratically legitimate decisionmakers. "t4 
(6) "The neutrality principle," which forbids courts to 
"mak[ e] law or policy out of whole cloth, [or] ... to impose sub-
stantive judicial judgments on disputes not capable of resoluton 
through the application of neutral principles to sharply defined 
sets of facts."ts 
I include among the scholars who generally subscribe to this 
model-the "Legal Process" model-not only Henry Hart, Her-
bert Wechsler, and Richard Fallon, but also other leading figures 
in Federal Courts scholarship over the past forty years, among 
9. ld. 
10. ld. at 964 & n.48, quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal 
Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 4 (William N. Eskridge, 
Jr. & PhilipP. Frickey pub. eds.) (Foundation Press, 1994). 
11. Reflections at 965 (cited in note 1 ). 
12. ld. 
13. Id. at 965-66. 
14. ld. at 966. 
15. ld. 
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them Akhil Amar, Paul Bator, George Brown, Erwin Chemerin-
sky, Daniel Meltzer, Henry Monaghan, Paul Mishkin, Gene 
Nichol, Martin Redish, David Shapiro, and Larry Yackle, as well 
as a host of younger scholars, such as Ann Althouse and Barry 
Friedman, who follow their lead. These Legal Process scholars 
do not always march in lockstep. For example, the "anti-positiv-
ist principle" counts for more with some than others.16 They also 
differ, sometimes sharply, on their views of what the law is and 
should be.l' All the same, these scholars share enough in com-
mon to justify placing them all under Fallon's Legal Process 
umbrella. 
II. PROCESS VALUES IN FEDERAL COURTS LAW 
Four premises of the Hart & Wechsler paradigm, the "anti-
positivist principle," the "principle of the rule of law," the "prin-
ciple of reasoned elaboration," and the "neutrality principle," re-
flect the emphasis Legal Process scholars place upon identifying 
the distinctive features of judicial decision making.ts Elaborating 
on Fallon's sketch, they formulate the constraints under which 
judges operate in a variety of ways-sometimes as a duty to treat 
like cases alike,t9 to make a coherent body of law that achieves 
"integrity,"2o to decide cases according to principle,21 or to avoid 
"checkerboard solutions" that make arbitrary distinctions be-
tween cases that are similar in relevant respects.22 Again, Legal 
Process scholars who advance arguments of this sort hardly con-
cur on all particulars. For my purposes, though, their areas of 
agreement are far more important than their disagreements. I 
shall treat them as a group, generally using the term "coherence" 
to represent their uniting features. 
16. Compare Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of 
the Judicial Function, 94 Yale LJ. 71 (1984) with David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Dis-
cretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543 (1985). 
17. Compare Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal 
Courts, 27 Viii. L. Rev. 1030 (1982} with Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of 
Article lll: Separating the Two Trers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205 (1985). 
18. For the historical roots of this effort, see G. Edward White, The Evolution of 
Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 Va. L. Rev. 279, 
280-91 (1973). 
19. See, e.g., M.P. Golding, Principled Decision-Making and the Supreme Court, 63 
Colum. L. Rev. 35, 38-40 (1963). 
20. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire at 165-67 (Harv. U. Press, 1986); Philip 
Soper, Dworkin's Domain, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1166, 1172-74 (1987). 
21. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Principles, Policies, and Fundamental Law 3-48 
(Harv. U. Press, 1961}; Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 
78 Colum. L. Rev. 982 (1978). 
22. See Dworkin, Law's Empire at 178-84 (cited in note 20). 
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I base my claim that federal courts law is largely incoherent 
on the proliferation of diametrically opposed principles in juris-
dictional doctrine. Some of these conflicts relate to separation of 
powers issues, and in particular to the role of the federal courts 
in our tripartite system of government. In broad terms, the issues 
here concern whether and when the federal courts should defer 
to the other branches. Other contradictory premises bear on the 
relationship between the federal courts and the state courts. Are 
the state courts the principal judicial bodies in our system, re-
flecting the Madisonian compromise of Article Ill, or are domi-
nant judicial roles to be assigned to the federal courts? On both 
separation of powers and federalism issues, the Supreme Court's 
pattern of decisions reflects considerable incoherence. 
A. SEPARATION OF PowERS 
The issue here is the role of the federal courts in the tripar-
tite scheme of American government. Is it better to think of fed-
eral courts as ordinary judicial tribunals whose task is to resolve 
traditional disputes, differing from state courts only in that Con-
gress may limit their jurisdiction? Or is the federal judiciary 
more appropriately considered an institution that defines and 
elaborates the meaning of constitutional and other public values, 
serving as a bulwark against overreaching by the legislative and 
executive branches?23 The Supreme Court has never settled on 
either of these alternatives or even on some synthesis of them. 
Instead, it has shifted back and forth between the poles, produc-
ing incoherent bodies of doctrine on a diverse range of issues. In 
the law of standing, for example, some decisions begin from the 
premise that the federal courts are traditional fora for dispute 
resolution,24 while other cases view the judiciary as the organ of 
government charged with the defense and explication of constitu-
tional values, and are little troubled by the niceties of common 
23. Cf. Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term- Foreword: Public Law 
Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (1982) (distinguishing two models 
of litigation, the "classical model" and the "contemporary" model, that roughly corre-
spond to the two conceptions of the federal judiciary discussed in the text). 
24. This, of course, is the regime of Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) 
(taxpayer lacks sufficiently strong interest to challenge federal statute providing subsidies 
to mothers and infants); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separa-
tion of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (taxpayers lack sufficiently concete injury to 
challenge executive branch transfer of property under the first amendment's establish-
ment clause); and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,- U.S.-, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (envi-
ronmentalists lack standing to challenge practices that result in general environmental 
injury that does not affect them in some particular way). 
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law litigation.25 Causation, redressability, third party standing 
and mootness decisions reflect similar tensions.26 
Other separation of powers doctrines are equally incoher-
ent. The Court has never squarely addressed the scope of Con-
gressional power to restrict federal jurisdiction.27 The Court's 
"opinions devoted to the ... validity of legislative and adminis-
trative tribunals [which lack Article III independence] are as 
troubled, arcane, confused and confusing as could be 
imagined."2s Its decisions on the appropriate scope of the federal 
common law of remedies began with Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Federal Agents,29 which takes a liberal view of judicial 
power and seems to rest on the premise that the federal judiciary 
serves as a bulwark against overreaching by the other branches.30 
More recently, in a line of cases that culminated with Schweiker 
v. Chilicky,3t the Court denies a damages action, even where 
other available remedies are not adequate to vindicate the as-
serted constitutional rights. The unstated premise of the holding 
in Chi/icky is that the federal courts have no special role in de-
fending constitutional rights against the other branches. It is too 
hasty to conclude that Chi/icky overrules Bivens, for the Court 
has not drawn the earlier case into question. But once again, 
25. See, e.g., Flost v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (taxpayers have standing to chal-
lenge on establishemnt clause grounds federal statute authorizing ai for religious schools); 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (voters may bring constitutional challenge against 
malapportioned districts); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 
438 U.S. 59 (1978) (environmentalists may challenge statute limiting liability for nuclear 
accidents before any accident has occurred). 
26. See, e.g., Chayes, 96 Harv. L. Rev. at 17-19 (cited in note 23); Gene R. Nichol, 
Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1117 (1989); Mark 
V. Thshnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 663, 
680-88 (1977). See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), McGowan v. Maryland, 
366 U.S. 420 (1961); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Gooding v. Wilron, 405 U.S. 518 
(1972). 
27. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) (ducking the "serious constitu-
tional question" of Congressional power to limit lower court jurisdiction over constitu-
tional claims); see also Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts at 410 & n.27 (cited in note 
2) (collecting cases). With regard to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, the language of Ex 
parte McCardle, 68 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868), suggests that Congress's power is plenary, 
but an opaque footnote seems to take back what the text has conceded. See William W. 
Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex parte McCardle, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 229, 248 (1973). 
28. Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative 
Courts Under Article iii, 65 Ind. L.J. 233, 239 (1990). 
29. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Much earlier the Court had, in effect, recognized an im-
plied federal cause of action for injunctive relief for constitutional violations. See P~ter 
W. Low and John C. Jeffries, Jr., Federal Courts and The Law of Federal-State Relatwns 
424 (Foundation Press, 3d ed. 1994) (discussing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).) 
30. Early cases following Bivens, including Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), 
and Carlron v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), reftect the same undergirding. 
31. 487 U.S. 412 (1988). See also Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983); Chappell v. 
Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987). 
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two opposing lines of decisions have been allowed to co-exist, 
resting on inconsistent and unarticulated premises.32 
B. FEDERALISM 
Apart from separation of powers issues, the major source of 
intellectual controversy in Federal Courts law is the allocation of 
jurisdiction between federal and state courts to hear federal is-
sues, especially constitutional challenges to state action. This is 
the central problem the Court faces in determining the proper 
scope of the federal question jurisdiction, the section 1983 cause 
of action, and federal habeas corpus for state prisoners. In 
resolving these issues, the Court might have begun from either of 
two general premises regarding the roles of federal and state 
courts in the federal system. It could characterize the state 
courts as the primary adjudicators of constitutional issues, with 
access to federal courts permitted only in exigent circum-
stances.33 Alternatively, it could presume that federal courts 
should generally be available at the behest of litigants with fed-
eral claims, unless there are compelling reasons to deny a federal 
forum.34 Or it might devise some more complex principle that 
avoids a stark rejection of either state or federal interests. In-
stead, it again moves between the two poles, shifting from a 
strong presumption in favor of state courts to a policy of primary 
access to federal jurisdiction, and back again. The best source of 
illustrations is Fallon's article, The Ideologies of Federal Courts 
Law,3s where he surveys a range of issues bearing on the alloca-
tion of authority between federal and state courts and concludes 
that "federal courts law is contradictory and unstable at its foun-
dations, because it credits the antinomic premises of the Federal-
ist and Nationalist models and oscillates between them."36 
32. See Nichol, 75 Va. L. Rev. at 1153-54 (cited in note 26). For more illustrations of 
this dichotomy between two views of the scope of Congressional power, see Richard H. 
Fallon and Daniel J. Meltzer, New.Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 
104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1779-87 (1991); Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: 
Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 735, 741-67 (1992). 
33. For an illustration of this approach, see Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and 
Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 605 (1981). 
34. This approach is illustrated by Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Absten-
tion, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 530 (1989) and Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of 
Judicial Business Betwen State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and "The Martian 
Chronicles", 78 Va. L. Rev. 1769 (1992). 
35. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 Va. L. Rev. 
1141, 1164-1223 (1988). 
36. Id. at 1223. See also Michael Wells, The Role of Comity in the Law of Federal 
Courts, 60 N.C. L. Rev. 59, 69-75 (1981); Friedman, 88 Mich. L. Rev. at 536-46 (cited in 
note 34). 
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III. JURISDICfiONAL POLICY VS. SUBSTANTIVE 
GOALS 
Besides the coherence constraint, which applies across the 
whole range of legal issues, Hart & Wechsler's "principle of 
structural interpretation" provides that "[i)n disputes about the 
proper allocation of decisionrnaking authority, the principles and 
policies underlying federalism and the separation of powers de-
serve special weight."37 Fallon does not specify the content of 
these "principles and policies underlying federalism and separa-
tion of powers." It will be necessary for present purposes to iden-
tify a few of them, for I wish to examine their actual role in 
adjudication. In the Hart & Wechsler paradigm, issues of stand-
ing, mootness, and ripeness tum on such considerations as the 
adverseness of the parties, how pressing is the need to decide an 
issue, whether the facts are sufficiently developed to permit ef-
fective adjudication, and whether judicial intervention would in-
trude on the prerogatives of the other branches. 
Decisionmaking is allocated between federal and state courts on 
the basis of such factors as the respective competence of the two 
systems, with state courts preferred for state law and federal 
courts for federal law. Other considerations bearing on the allo-
cation issue include sensitivity to the state interest in a role for 
state courts in deciding constitutional challenges to state law and 
in construing state law so as to save it from nullification, due re-
gard for state procedures, and respect for the value of finality in 
litigation. Such general policies as promoting uniformity in fed-
eral law, efficiency in litigation, and avoidance of unnecessary 
constitutional decisions, also contribute to jurisdictional doctrine. 
These aims, though sometimes at odds with one another, 
may be grouped together for the sake of analysis under the ru-
bric "jurisdictional policy." In order to test their importance in 
the resolution of cases, jurisdictional policy considerations may 
be contrasted with a very different ground of decision: the desire 
to further some substantive interest. The Court may employ ju-
risdictional law either to advance or hinder the states' substan-
tive interests in regulation as against the contrary individual 
interest in constitutional constraints on state regulation. In a se-
ries of earlier articles I develop the theme that substantive inter-
ests heavily influence jurisdictional decisions.3s To summarize, 
the first step is to recognize that jurisdictional decisions on such 
37. Reflections at 965 (cited in note 1). 
38. See Michael Wells, The Impact of Substantive Interests on the Law of Federal 
Courts, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 499 (1989); Michael Wells, Rhetoric and Reality in the 
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matters as standing, federal review of state judgments, and the 
allocation of cases between federal and state courts often have 
consequences for substantive rights and obligations, not merely in 
the dispute at hand but across a range of cases with similar fea-
tures.39 Though the Court rarely acknowledges the influence of 
substance upon its decisions, preferring to speak of jurisdictional 
policy, its actions often belie its words. A given jurisdictional 
policy seems to carry great weight in one context, only to be ig-
nored in another where it seems equally applicable. A more 
plausible explanation for many jurisdictional rulings is that the 
Court seeks indirectly to advance substantive interests by allocat-
ing disputes to one or another tribunal or keeping them out of 
court altogether.40 
When the Court bases jurisdictional decisions on substantive 
considerations, federalism and separation of powers concerns 
("jurisdictional policy" in my usage) simply cannot receive the 
priority Hart & Wechsler accord them. That is why substantive 
themes in jurisdictional decisionmaking threaten the integrity of 
the Hart & Wechsler paradigm. Since jurisdictional policy is the 
glue that holds together the cases Hart & Wechsler call Federal 
Courts law, showing that substantive interests have significant 
impact on allocational decisions undermines the descriptive util-
ity of their model. Unless jurisdictional policy concerns domi-
nate adjudication in the area, their structure is of secondary 
importance, a partial model useful only in those cases where sub-
stance does not have much influence. 
Fallon recognizes the threat and tries to save the paradigm 
by co-opting the substantive theme. He concedes that substance 
plays a role in jurisdictional law, but maintains that this is com-
patible with the Legal Process tradition.4t For example, Hart & 
Wechsler proposed that "protective jurisdiction"-federal juris-
Law of Federal Courts, 6 Const. Comm. 367 (1989); Michael Wells, Is Disparity a Prob-
lem?, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 283 (1988). 
39. See Wells, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 505-10 (cited in note 38). 
40. See id. at 519-40. In a conversation about this article, Fallon suggested that the 
distinction between jurisdictional policy and substantive goals is illusory, since the ulti-
mate aim behind policies like finality, comity, uniformity, and the rest is a regime of 
jurisdictional law that achieves the best body of substantive law. So it is. Yet the distinc-
tion remains illuminating, for in the Hart & Wechsler paradigm these policies are the 
grounds for a body of jurisdictional law that facilitates the implementation of whatever 
substantive goals happen to be generated elsewhere in the legal system. By contrast, my 
thesis (elaborated in the articles cited in note 38) is that the Court often abandons juris-
dictional policy as its grounds for jurisdictional rules. Instead it begins with the specific 
substantive aims of favoring or thwarting state regulatory interests and chooses jurisdic-
tional rules that will advance its substantive agenda. 
41. Reflections at 973 & nn.85-86 (cited in note 1). 
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diction over state law questions-would be appropriate if some 
federal interest were at stake in a case and state courts could not 
be trusted to give it sufficient weight. 42 Similarly, Paul Bator 
generally disapproved of federal habeas corpus for state prison-
ers, but would have allowed habeas review where the petitioner 
had not received a full and fair hearing of his federal claims in 
state court.43 
As these examples show, however, substantive interests typi-
cally serve only a subsidiary and derivative function in the Hart 
& Wechsler paradigm. Substance matters only because of the 
Hart & Wechsler premise that, as a matter of jurisdictional pol-
icy, allocation decisions should tum, in part, on the competence 
of the tribunal.44 If federal interests or federal rights cannot re-
ceive a fair hearing in a state court, then the state court is not 
competent to adjudicate them.4s This standard will only be met 
in the rare case where there is a wide gap between the state and 
federal courts. 46 While the substantive impact of jurisdictional 
doctrine acts as a marginal limiting principle in Hart & Wechsler, 
substantive interests in fact influence a far broader range of cases 
than Legal Process scholars would allow. The Hart & Wechsler 
paradigm cannot account for the ubiquitous role substance actu-
ally plays in Federal Courts law. 
Can the menace posed by substantive themes to Hart & 
Wechsler be deflected by modifying the model? Not likely. The 
only "modification" that would work is to acknowledge a bigger 
role for substance than institutional competence arguments 
would allow.47 In that event, the effort to save the paradigm 
42. See Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts at 745-46 (cited in note 2). 
43. See Paul M. Bator, Finalily in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for 
State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441 (1963). 
44. See Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts at xi-xii (cited in note 2); Neil Dux-
bury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 601, 657-61 (1993). 
45. See Bator, et al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts at 1654-55 (cited in 
note 2). 
46. Cf. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction: The Limits of Models, 66 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 2507,2511 n. 20 (1993) (asserting that the mere presence of substantive impact is not 
enough to overcome jurisdictional policy considerations). 
47. Some of Fallon's examples suggest that the Hart & Wechsler paradigm recog-
nizes a role for substance beyond considerations of institutional competence. In particu-
lar Fallon mentions Hart & Wechsler's "generally hospitable stance toward ad~trative adjudication" and Hart's support for federal habeas corpus, both of which 
may be grounded in substantive considerations. Neither Hart nor Fallon argue that these 
allocation choices depend on an argument that courts are not competent to hear matters 
confided to agencies or that habeas is generally appropriate because state co~rts .cannot 
be trusted to apply the constitution correctly. Reflections at fJ73-74 & n.86 (ctted m note 
1). 
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would end up destroying it. Jurisdictional policy would have no 
special role in Federal Courts law, but would always have to com-
pete with substantive interests for the Court's favor. To the ex-
tent substantive considerations override jurisdictional policy-
and the Supreme Court's performance indicates that they often 
do so-Hart & Wechsler's aim of making a body of allocational 
law that implements the values of federalism and separation of 
powers is severely compromised, if not lost altogether. 
IV. TOWARD A PRAGMATIC PARADIGM OF 
FEDERAL COURTS LAW 
What is accomplished by showing that the Hart & Wechsler 
paradigm fails to explain many significant developments in Fed-
eral Courts Law over the past thirty years? After all, any model 
abstracts from reality in an effort to locate the common threads 
running through the bulk of the cases. There will virtually always 
be some aberrant cases that do not fit. Notwithstanding all the 
anomalies, Hart & Wechsler still helps us to make sense of much 
Federal Courts doctrine. Armed with the casebook, or one of 
the books it has inspired, a lawyer is well-equipped to grapple 
with most routine jurisdictional issues.4s Hart & Wechsler will, 
and should, remain the reigning paradigm until someone comes 
up with a model that is more useful in explaining and predicting 
outcomes of hard cases, and in identifying the normative issues 
raised by such cases. 49 
This section of the article proposes an alternative to Hart & 
Wechsler. The new model builds upon the critique developed in 
earlier articles and summarized in the preceding sections. Legal 
Process scholars take it for granted that courts do and should 
adhere to process values, the concerns that I have lumped to-
gether under the heading "coherence." In the particular context 
48. Cf. Richard A. Matasar, Treatise Writing and Federal Jurisdiction Scholarship: 
Does Doctrine Maner When Law Is Politics?, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1499,1515 (1991) (review-
ing Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction (Little Brown & Co. (1989)) (pointing out 
that Chemerinsky's Federal Jurisdiction treatise is valuable in spite of the instability of 
Federal Courts law, because "lower courts act as if they are constrained by doctrine," 
because "some questions, even in federal jurisdiction cases, have easy, non-controversial 
answers," and because "treatises help students.") 
49. This insight is "a central point" of Thomas Kuhn's intellectual history of science. 
Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions at 77 (cited in note 7) ("[T)he act of judgment that leads 
scientists to reject a previously accepted theory is always based upon more than a com-
parison of that theory with the world. The decision to reject one paradigm is always simul-
taneously the decision to accept another, and the judgment leading to that decision 
involves the comparison of both paradigms with nature and with each other.") (emphasis 
in original) Whatever the differences between the role of paradigms in law and in science, 
this proposition seems applicable to law as well. 
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of Federal Courts, they begin their analysis of any issue from the 
assumption that principles of federalism and separation of pow-
ers, which I have labeled "jurisdictional policy," do and should 
control the outcome. While the counterexamples to Hart & 
Wechsler are not by themselves fatal, they do raise questions that 
Legal Process scholars never address. Significant departures 
from the model cast doubt on the viability of Hart & Wechsler's 
assumptions. They raise the possibility that the unconforming 
cases are not aberrations at all, but rather indications that the 
model overlooks some important themes that lawyers and schol-
ars who seek to understand and improve Federal Courts law 
need to examine. 
I call the new paradigm a "pragmatic" model of Federal 
Courts law in order to underline a central difference between its 
premises and those of Hart & Wechsler. Hart & Wechsler takes 
the predominance of jurisdictional policy and process values as 
foundational assumptions that are themselves beyond question. 
By contrast, a characteristic of pragmatism in philosophy and law 
is its refusal to take any proposition as foundational.so Instead, 
pragmatists hold that the strength of a value may vary according 
to context. Notably, they believe in "balancing rule-of-law vir-
tues against equitable and discretionary case-specific considera-
tions."st The linchpin of the new model is that, from a pragmatic 
perspective, jurisdictional policy and process values may be 
strong enough to control some allocation disputes but not others. 
A. DESCRIBING FEDERAL CouRTS LAw 
Like Hart & Wechsler, the pragmatic model has both de-
scriptive and normative dimensions. Its descriptive claims should 
be evident by now: Coherence and jurisdictional policy in fact 
count for far less in Federal Courts law than the Hart & Wechsler 
model suggests, especially in the hard cases that most severely 
test the Supreme Court's fidelity to the theory. Arbitrary distinc-
tions and doctrinal confusion are persistent features of modem 
Federal Courts law. Many doctrinal developments cannot be un-
derstood without taking account of the substantive interests fur-
thered by the jurisdictional holding. 
50. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 26-28, 462 (Harv. 
U. Press, 1990); Edwin W. Patterson, Men and Ideas of the Law at 471-73 (Foundation 
Press, 1953); Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 12 Minn. L. Rev. 
1331, 1334-49 (1988). 
51. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence at 26 (cited in note 50). 
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I submit that the new paradigm is descriptively more power-
ful, and therefore more useful to scholars and students seeking to 
understand what the Court does and why, than Hart & Wechsler. 
Students schooled in the new paradigm would have foreseen, in 
1960, that the Warren Court would tear down barriers to federal 
court and, a decade later, that the conservative majority of the 
1970s and 1980s would put those barriers up again. They would 
understand the chronic instability of the law of legislative courts, 
habeas corpus, and Supreme Court review of state judgments. 
They would recognize that these shifts in direction on the Court's 
part almost inevitably produce arbitrary distinctions in the case 
law. By treating these and other examples of incoherent doctrine 
and substantive themes as though they were merely aberrations, 
the Hart & Wechsler paradigm fails to respect their ubiquity in 
Federal Courts doctrine. 
Some parts of Federal Courts doctrine remain coherent and 
some are based on jurisdictional policy rather than substance. 
The pragmatic paradigm provides a means for determining which 
areas are likely to fall into this category. Substance will play a 
significant role only where the ruling on the jurisdictional issue 
can have substantive impact across a range of cases featuring 
similar characteristics. So long as there is disparity between fed-
eral and state courts, state governments and their officers will 
tend to prefer state court and persons challenging state action on 
federal grounds will want to litigate in federal court. But sub-
stantive themes will generally not intrude on issues like appeala-
bility, or most of the law of ripeness and mootness, or the role of 
federal procedural law in diversity cases, where the substantive 
interests furthered by a given jurisdictional ruling will vary from 
case to case. Substantive themes will be comparatively less im-
portant in periods of our history when there is little disparity be-
tween federal and state courts, such as the period between the 
New Deal and the Warren Court.s2 
Incoherence and confusion proliferate where there is serious 
disagreement over the proper rule, either because of the substan-
tive consequences of the rule or because of divergent views of 
jurisdictional policy. For example, the legal regime regarding 
legislative courts will remain instable and incoherent for as long 
as the justices cannot agree about the comparative importance of 
the abstract value of adjudication by an independent judiciary 
versus the practical concerns that motivate Congress to channel 
an array of issues to lesser tribunals. By contrast, at least since 
52. Wells, 22 Ga. L. Rev. at 311 (cited in note 38). 
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the Civil War no one has seriously questioned the validity of 
Supreme Court review of state judgments turning on federal is-
sues or the general principle of federal supremacy. That is why 
Martin v. Hunter's Lessees3 remains in the casebooks, while 
American Insurance Co. v. Canter54 (an early "legislative courts" 
case) is relegated to a note, if it is mentioned at all. 
Unlike the conflict between substance and jurisdictional pol-
icy, this tension between fidelity to process values and a court's 
proclivity to seize the opportunity to enforce its own values is 
hardly limited to Federal Courts context. It runs throughout the 
law, and process values may lose out to other considerations in 
any doctrinal context. An ambitious version of the new para-
digm would claim that process values are especially weak in the 
modem Federal Courts context. Proving this assertion would re-
quire a detailed comparison of incoherence across doctrinal con-
texts, a task that cannot be undertaken here. For purposes of 
sketching the new paradigm, it seems sufficient to point out that 
over the past thirty years few areas of the law have undergone 
the kind of wrenching changes, first in one direction and then in 
another, witnessed by Federal Courts law in that period. 
Whether or not this history shows that process values are weaker 
in Federal Courts law than elsewhere, it does rebut the Legal 
Process assumption that process values are strong in the Federal 
Courts context. 
B. NoRMATIVE IssuEs 
Demonstrating the descriptive inadequacy of the Hart & 
Wechsler paradigm is not enough to bring it down. As Fallon 
points out, "[ e ]ven if some other model did have greater descrip-
tive power, this ... would not be fatal to the normative claims of 
the Legal Process school."ss But it is here, in regard to the nor-
mative foundations of allocation doctrine, that a new paradigm is 
most needed in our effort to appreciate the nature of Federal 
Courts law and learn how to make it better. The problem with 
the Hart & Wechsler paradigm is not that its normative claims 
are patently unconvincing. Rather, the fault is that Hart & 
Wechsler takes for granted normative premises that are contesta-
ble, and hence require analysis and justification. The pragmatic 
paradigm provides a framework for undertaking that analysis 
53. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
54. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). 
55. Reflections at 975 n.93 (cited in note 1). 
1994-95] BUSTING HART & WECHSLER 571 
and for evaluating the normative claims of the Legal Process in 
Federal Courts law. 
1. The Normative Force of Jurisdictional Policy 
Fallon's third methodological assumption is that "[i]n dis-
putes about the proper allocation of decisionmaking authority, 
the principles and policies underlying federalism and the separa-
tion of powers deserve special weight."s6 Accordingly, one nor-
mative component of the Hart & Wechsler paradigm is a claim 
that federalism and separation of powers concerns like compe-
tence, comity, uniformity, finality, and fitness should generally 
override substantive considerations in the resolution of jurisdic-
tional issues. Unlike Hart & Wechsler, the pragmatic paradigm 
does not take this Legal Process precept as an assumption; it re-
quires that the normative claim be defended. The normative is-
sue identified by the new paradigm regarding the role of 
jurisdictional policy in resolving Federal Courts issues is whether 
partisans of the Legal Process can justify the preeminent role 
they assign jurisdictional policy. My aim here is not to settle this 
issue, but only to identify some arguments that may bear upon it. 
One step in addressing the normative issue is to examine the 
reasons behind the high ranking accorded jurisdictional policy by 
Legal Process scholars. Why should jurisdictional policy receive 
so much respect? The reason for giving special weight to consid-
erations of federalism and separation of powers cannot be found 
within the Hart & Wechsler paradigm. The problem here is not 
whether finality should rank higher than uniformity, or whether 
federal-state comity should be sacrificed for reasons of institu-
tional competence. It is the validity of Hart & Wechsler's prem-
ise that the whole complex of jurisdictional policy issues should 
receive special weight as against substantive considerations. 
In order to understand this premise, we must look instead to 
the broader context of Legal Process theory. The Legal Process 
movement was a response to the perceived nihilism of the Real-
ists, who had sometimes portrayed adjudication as a matter of 
choosing between conflicting interests rather than as a quest to 
identify and implement the common good.s1 In the Legal Pro-
cess, Henry Hart and Albert Sacks conceded that judges make 
choices among conflicting interests, and set about showing how 
56. ld. at 965. 
57. See G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurispru· 
dence and Social Change in Early Twentieth Century America, 58 Va. L. Rev. 999, 1017-26 
(1972). 
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their discretion is nevertheless constrained by the obligation to 
engage in reasoned elaboration of legal materials.ss In addition, 
there is a sphere in which consensus is attainable, for we should 
be able to agree on the allocation of decisionmaking among 
institutions. 59 
Hart and Sacks declared that these "institutionalized proce-
dures and the constitutive arrangements establishing and gov-
erning them are obviously more fundamental than the 
substantive arrangements in the structure of society . . . since 
they are at once the source of the substantive arrangements and 
the indispensable means of making them work effectively. "60 
The purpose of a legal system is to "maximiz[ e] the total satisfac-
tions of valid human wants."6t A federal system, with its "varied 
facilities, providing alternative means of working out ... solu-
tions of problems which cannot be solved unilaterally,"62 is the 
best way to "maximize[ ] the opportunities for coping effectively 
with the problems of social living. "63 Federal Courts law, with its 
emphasis on such values as competence, comity, finality, uni-
formity, and the like, is our mechanism for assigning decisions to 
the appropriate institutions. Given this aim, jurisdictional policy 
must control allocation decisions. 
While a focus on federalism and separation of powers may 
help achieve Hart's aim of "releas[ing] to the utmost the enor-
mous potential of the human abilities in the society,"64 the bene-
fits come at a price. The opportunity to pursue the Justices' 
substantive agenda will be lost. Had the Warren Court taken se-
riously the values of finality and respect for state procedures, Fay 
v. Noia6s would not have abandoned the old regime of strict pro-
cedural default. If co-ordinating federal and state litigation so as 
to avoid disruption had mattered much to the Burger Court, it 
would not have held in Hicks v. Miranda66 that a federal section 
1983 case must be dismissed if a state prosecution is filed after 
the federal case has already begun. Putting aside the issue of 
which substantive agenda is better, the problem for Legal Pro-
58. See Hart and Sacks, The Legal Process at 92-93, 141-43, 144-50, 155 (cited in 
note 10). 
59. Id. at 3-4; Reflections at 964 (cited in note 1). 
60. ld. at 3-4. 
61. Id. at 105. See also Duxbury, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. at 656-57 (cited in note 44). 
62. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between Smte and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. 
Rev. 489, 490 (1954). 
63. ld. at 542. See also Reflections at 965 (cited in note 1). 
64. Hart, 54 Colum. L. Rev. at 490 (cited in note 62). 
65. 372 u.s. 391 (1963). 
66. 422 U.S. 332 (1975). See Wells, 60 N.C. L. Rev. at 71 (cited in note 36). 
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cess theorists is to explain why the Court should forego its sub-
stantive agenda in order to pursue the benefits that may flow 
from the wise application of jurisdictional policy. 
How can the case for substance be· rebutted? We may use-
fully distinguish between two kinds of arguments one might ad-
vance for the priority of jurisdictional policy. First, one might try 
to show that an allocation decision is presumptively illegitimate if 
it turns on substantive considerations, so that little or nothing of 
value is lost when judges are forbidden to take substance into 
account. Even a pragmatist could be convinced that some kinds 
of judicial behavior, accepting a bribe, for example, are virtually 
always wrong. It is doubtful whether such an argument could be 
made with regard to substantive interests and jurisdictional rul-
ings. For one thing, the Hart & Wechsler paradigm itself some-
times employs substantive factors. Although the role of 
substance is generally limited to the jurisdictional policy of assur-
ing a competent tribunal, neither Henry Hart nor Richard Fallon 
seems inclined to forbid recourse to substantive themes beyond 
the competence policy.67 Note, too, the relevance of the many 
situations in which substance actually counts. While we cannot 
derive an ought from an is, the Court's frequent resort to sub-
stance should at least give us pause before condemning the prac-
tice root and branch. None of this is to deny the possibility of a 
Legal Process argument against substance. A Legal Process pur-
ist might show that even Henry Hart strayed from the true path. 
The point of my argument is that devotees of Hart & Wechsler 
must undertake to defend the rejection of substance rather than 
treat it as holy writ. 
Second, Process theorists may abandon the effort to find a 
general and powerful argument against substance, and instead 
apply a balancing test. Following this course, they would ac-
knowledge that the priority of jurisdictional policy reflects a 
choice of values on their part, a preference for federalism and 
separation of powers over substantive themes, rather than a nec-
essary feature of sound adjudication. In this kind of argument 
subtance is no longer illegitimate, but only a weaker value than 
jurisdictional policy. Hence, this argument admits that the imple-
mentation of principles of federalism and separation of powers 
comes at a price. The priority they receive necessarily means 
that the Court must forego the opportunity to pursue its (legiti-
mate) substantive agenda by jurisdictional means. 
67. See discussion in note 47. 
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Adopting the second argumentative strategy has another 
consequence that deserves attention. If balancing is the appro-
priate inquiry, then the strength of the arguments on either side 
may vary from one issue to another, so that substantive consider-
ations may properly dominate some decisions but not others. A 
couple of examples will help to make the point. 
In the midst of the Warren Court's program of opening the 
federal courts to more constitutional claims, it was asked to allow 
removal of a state prosecution to federal district court whenever 
the defendant raises certain constitutional claims. The Court re-
jected the invitation,68 despite its own evident sympathy with the 
substantive goal behind it, and did so for reasons of jurisdictional 
policy that nearly everyone would find persuasive. The burden 
on federal courts and disruption of state processes that such a 
scheme would entail are sufficient to discredit it.69 Keep in mind, 
too, that broad federal habeas was available in that era to protect 
the substantive interests of persons unconstitutionally convicted 
in state court. 
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Sepa-
ration of Church and State'o presents the balance between sub-
stance and jurisdictional policy in a wholly different light. The 
government had essentially given away property to a religious 
organization, and citizens and taxpayers opposed to government 
support for religion sued to rescind the deal, asserting that it vio-
lated the Establishment Clause. The Court denied standing, cit-
ing other cases holding that taxpayers and citizens generally lack 
sufficient injury to guarantee effective adjudication, a jurisdic-
tional policy.n Plaintiffs sought to avoid the earlier cases on the 
ground that they concerned efforts to enforce constitutional pro-
visions requiring open budgets and separation between legisla-
tive and executive functions, while their case presented claimed 
violation of their constitutional rights. The Court spumed the 
proferred distinction: "[W]e know of no principled basis on 
which to create a hierarchy of constitutonal values or a comple-
mentary 'sliding scale' of standing .. . "n Under the pragmatic 
model, this retort is not available. It would be perfectly accepta-
ble to hold that jurisdictional policy generally precludes citizen 
68. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966); City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 
808 (1966). 
69. See Bator, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 611-12 (cited in note 33). 
70. 454 U.S. 464 (1982). 
71. 454 U.S. at 477, 481-83. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing on the Constitution: 
The Supreme Court and Valley Forge, 61 N.C. L. Rev. 798, 821-27 (1983}. 
72. 454 U.S. at 484. 
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standing, but not where there is a substantive right at stake, as 
there is in Establishment Clause cases. 
In addition, the role of substance may vary from one histori-
cal period to another. In times where allocational decisions have 
only slight and unthematic substantive impact, then jurisdictional 
policy would have strong normative force. Deciding jurisdic-
tional issues within the Hart & Wechsler paradigm would come 
at a low cost, for it would not require judges to forego the oppor-
tunity to pursue substantive ends instead. The forties and early 
fifties, when Henry Hart and his colleagues worked on both the 
Legal Process materials and the Federal Courts casebook, may 
have been such a time.73 During and after World War II, Ameri-
cans were largely united on the superiority of democratic rule 
and individual liberty over their totalitarian competitors in Ger-
many and Russia. Even leading Realists like Karl Llewellyn and 
Jerome Frank embraced those values.74 "Secular, humanistic, 
patriotic, and centrist, the American intellectual scene in the late 
1950s and early 1960s were remarkably free from ideological 
strife."7s 
The growth of modern public law litigation, beginning in 
1954 with Brown v. Board of Education, and accelerating in the 
sixties, put an end to this harmony. Disparity between federal 
and state courts grew more marked, and with it the substantive 
impact of allocational decisions became harder to ignore. Judges 
might have shared the Legal Process faith in process as a means 
toward a better society and resisted any role for substantive con-
siderations in jurisdictional decisions. But, as noted earlier, they 
often chose substance over process. First the Warren Court bent 
Federal Courts law to its agenda of substantive constitutional re-
form, increasing the authority of federal courts by eliminating old 
barriers to access. Then its right-wing successor began curbing 
access to the federal forum. 76 
The normative value of the Hart & Wechsler paradigm is 
necessarily weaker when opportunities to pursue a substantive 
agenda are present, as they are when constitutional law is a lively 
area with many controversial issues. During periods like the 
73. See Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 
13 Law & Contemp. Probs. 216,217-18 (1948) (describing the problems of Federal Courts 
law in Legal Process terms). 
74. See White, 59 Va. L. Rev. at 282-86 (cited in note 18). 
75. Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-
1987, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 761, 765 (1987). 
76. See Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process 
Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 609, 629-41 (1991). 
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present, when adherence to jurisdictional policy requires passing 
up the chance to pursue a substantive goal, the cost of fidelity to 
the Hart & Wechsler paradigm is higher than it is in more tran-
quil times marked by consensus. No thoughtful person would 
deny that jurisdictional policies serve worthy goals. The point is 
that, even so, the paramount value they receive in the Hart & 
Wechsler paradigm turns out to be the result of a value choice 
that could plausibly be made the other way. Putting jurisictional 
policy first is not an essential requisite of sound adjudication of 
Federal Courts issues. 
2. Is Incoherence a Problem? 
Legal Process scholars treat the effort to achieve coherence 
as a primary feature of the judicial function. For example, Her-
bert Wechsler claimed that "the main constituent of the judicial 
process is that it must be genuinely principled."'' For Alexander 
Bickel, "intellectual incoherence [was] not excusable."'s Ronald 
Dworkin maintains that "integrity (his name for coherence] ... is 
the life of law as we know it. "79 Categorial declarations like these 
admit no exceptons. The notion that coherence may be a weak 
value, in Federal Courts law or anywhere else, is antithetical to 
the basic principles of the Legal Process school. 
The pragmatic paradigm holds that the case for coherence is 
more problematic. It is wrong to treat coherence or any other 
proposition of legal theory as though it were immutable and ab-
solute across every doctrinal context. On account of the distinc-
tive features of Federal Courts law, coherence may be less vital 
here than it is in many other doctrinal areas. At the same time, 
pursuing coherence comes at a price, for it interferes with other 
worthy aims. The dichotomies identified in Part II show that in 
Federal Courts law the Court has tended to rank other goals 
higher than coherence and hence has been willing to tolerate a 
higher degree of inconsistency than is permitted elsewhere. The 
persistence of incoherence in Federal Courts law does not mean 
the Court is right to act in this way. Still, it should prompt us to 
examine the Legal Process assumption favoring coherence. 
Whether the Court's practice is good or bad, Legal Process theo-
rists must face the normative issue rather than merely assuming, 
77. Wechsler, Principles, Policiu and Fundllmental Law at 21 (cited in note 21). 
78. Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 47 (Harper & 
Row, 1970). See also Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 58-59 (Bobbs-Merrill Co., 
1962). 
79. Dworkin, Law's Empire at 167 (cited in note 20). 
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as they are prone to do, that coherence is vitai.so If we are to 
understand and enrich Federal Courts law, we must address the 
conflict of values, defend the priority of coherence, and perhaps 
decide that it can sometimes be sacrificed to other ends. 
Theorists like Bickel and Wechsler are wrong if they mean 
to accord coherence lexical priority over all other goals that 
courts might seek to attain.s1 Wechsler's insistence on the im-
portance of principled decisionmaking as "the main constituent 
of the judicial process" and Bickel's stern admonition that inco-
herence is inexcusable suggest that coherence is an essential ele-
ment of all adjudication. Unless a court puts coherence first, 
they argue, decisions are illegitimate. The judicial function is to 
adjudicate, and unprincipled decisionmaking is not adjudication 
at all. 
This kind of language is perhaps best understood as rhetori-
cal emphasis, for it is typically found in arguments aimed at con-
vincing the reader that coherence is important, and bemoaning 
the lack of it in Supreme Court decisions. If Wechsler and Bickel 
are taken to assert that coherence comes before all other goals, 
then their view is untenable. Courts could not function if they 
had to guarantee coherence above all other goals, for judges can-
not be expected to work out all the answers when they decide the 
80. A few years ago Richard Fallon, in a characteristic Legal Process article, ex-
amined the law on allocation of decisionmaking between federal and state courts and 
found it (as I do) "contradictory and unstable at its foundations." 79 Va. L. Rev. at 1223 
(cited in note 35). Rather than asking whether this is bad, and why, (as the pragmatic 
model requires), he assumed that it needed correction, and went on to "offer prescrip-
tions for a better reasoned and more coherent body of law." ld. at 1151. See also Redish, 
78 Va. L. Rev. at 1769 (cited in note 34); Friedman, 88 Mich. L. Rev. at 531-34 (cited in 
note 34). 
81. If coherence were defined narrowly, as intelligibility, it may well deserve this 
priority. Lower courts and everyone else need to be able to determine what the law is. 
But a group of decisions can all be intelligible and still be incoherent in that they create 
arbitrary distinctions between like cases. See Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 
B.U. L. Rev. 273, 276-n (1992) (distinguishing "coherence as intelligibility" from the use 
of the term by philosophers in coherence theories of truth). 
For example, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) found taxpayers had standing to 
challenge, on first amendment establishment clause grounds, government aid to parochial 
schools. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982), denied standing to taxpayers seeking to challenge, on first 
amendment grounds establishment clause grounds, a government transfer of property to 
a religious organization. The Valley Forge Court distinguished Flast on the ground that 
Flast concerned action by Congress while the government action attacked in Flast was 
taken by an executive official. See 454 U.S. at 479. 
These cases are each intelligible; each sends a clear signal to lower courts as to how 
later cases are to be treated. They have created no doctrinal conundrums for lower 
courts. But the taxpayer standing doctrine they create is incoherent, in that there is no 
good reason why it should matter whether the challenged acion is committed by Congress 
or an executive official. See Nichol, 61 N.C. L. Rev. at 813-14 (cited in note 71). 
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first case on a given topic.s2 Nor can we expect all the members 
of a multi-member Court to agree on the rationales for their rul-
ings.s3 The common law method calls for decision on narrow 
grounds, working incrementally and gaining insight, until it is 
possible "by a true induction to state the principle which has ... 
been [only] obscurely felt."84 Other well-established practices in-
dicate that coherence may sometimes be overridden by other val-
ues. The large role of jury decisionmaking leads to arbitrary 
distinctions, as "the idiosyncracies of jury composition combine 
to hand similar victims altogether dissimilar results. "ss Criminal 
sentencing is another prominent example. As Judge Marvin 
Frankel has observed, "widely unequal sentences are imposed 
every day in great numbers for crimes and criminals not essen-
tially distinguishable from each other."86 
These examples of sacrificing coherence in favor of other 
ends should caution us against conceiving of principled decision-
making as a foundational element of adjudication. Rather, co-
herence is an aim that must be considered alongside other goals. 
Its appropriate weight varies from one context to another, be-
cause the values underlying it are more crucial in some arenas 
than others.s1 In order to evaluate its proper role in Federal 
Courts law, we must first identify the values it serves and then 
assess their importance in the federal jurisdictional context. 
Because coherence seems so obviously desirable, neither 
judges nor scholars who champion it devote much attention to 
explaining why coherence is worth achieving. Bickel and Wechs-
ler can be understood as arguing that coherence is essential in 
the constitutional context because judges must not impose their 
own values to override the democratic branches of government. 
82. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Founh Amendment, 58 Minn. 
L. Rev. 349,351-52 (1974); Thurman Arnold, Professor Han's Theology, 13 Harv. L. Rev. 
1298, 1311-12 (1960). 
83. See Frank N. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802 
(1982). 
84. Paul A. Freund, On Law and Justice 76 (Harv. U. Press, 1968) (citing Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Codes and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 Am. L. Rev. 1 (1870), re-
printed in 44 Harv. L. Rev. 725 (1931). 
85. Stephen D. Sugerman, Doing Away with Ton Law, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 555, 594 
(1985). 
86. Marvin E. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order 8 (Hilland Wang, 
1972). Sentencing guidelines represent an effort to diminish these disparities, yet they 
have encountered strong resistance from judges and scholars who think justice is better 
served by broad discretion to take many factors into account. See, e.g., Albert A .. Al-
schuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. Ch1. L. 
Rev. 901 (1991). 
87. See Kenneth I. Winston, On Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 35-39 
(1974). 
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Adherence to "neutral principles" will assure that they do not.BB 
Whatever its merit, this thesis cannot account for the emphasis 
judges place on coherence in other areas of law. 
Ronald Dworkin proposes a rationale for coherence in adju-
dication that is more fundamental to the legal order than those of 
Wechsler and Bickel. His reasoning deserves careful attention, 
because it yields a clue to understanding why coherence may de-
serve comparatively little weight in Federal Courts law. In 
Dworkin's view, coherence, or "integrity" as he calls it, is "a dis-
tinct political virtue beside justice and fairness. "s9 Integrity is an 
attractive goal for a variety of reasons. It "provides protection 
against partiality or deceit or other forms of official corrup-
tion,"90 and "contributes to the efficiency of law" by avoiding the 
need for detailed rules on everything.9t 
There is, however, another and more vital reason to strive 
for integrity in adjudication. A commitment to coherence in gov-
ernment decisionmaking helps to justify the government's claim 
to obedience from citizens, by making its decisions more accepta-
ble to the losers than they otherwise would be. This concern for 
giving the losers in conflicts over rights and obligations a coher-
ent explanation shows respect for all citizens and thereby con-
tributes to the well-being of the society as a whole.92 In order to 
make his point, Dworkin compares three imaginary communities,. 
one committed to integrity, one that emphasizes rules, and one in 
which government makes pragmatic, case-by-case judgments that 
give no special role to either principle or rule. He considers the 
claims of each to obedience by its members. 
For Dworkin pragmatism is unattractive because the mem-
bers of a pragmatic community necessarily "have no special con-
cern for justice or fairness toward fellow members of their 
community."93 People in a rulebook community need only re-
spect the rules, and hence "are free to act in politics almost as 
selfishly as people in a community of circumstances can. "94 
Neither rule-based decisionmaking nor pragmatic case-by-case 
judgments will warrant as much respect from those disadvan-
taged by the outcome of adjudication as will a process that is 
88. See Wechsler, Principles, Policies and Fundamental Law at 21-23, 27 (cited in 
note 21). 
89. Dworkin, Law's Empire at 166 (cited in note 20). 
90. Id. at 188. 
91. ld. at 188-89. 
92. Id. at 191-92. 
93. ld. at 212. 
94. Id. 
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committed to coherence.9s "A community of principle, faithful 
to that promise, can claim the authority of a genuine associative 
community and can therefore claim moral legitimacy-that its 
collective decisions are matters of obligation and not bare 
power-in the name of fraternity."% 
Dworkin may be right that judicial decisions determining 
rights and liabilities deserve substantially more respect, even 
from the losers, when judges strive for coherence than when they 
draw arbitrary lines. No one likes to lose, but defeat is easier to 
accept when based on substantial reasons. Yet the foregoing dis-
cussion of coherence shows that it is not an essential element of 
adjudication. It is a means of implementing values whose 
strength varies depending on context. The force of Dworkin's 
argument is strongest when judges are determining substantive 
rights and duties.97 The loser who deserves an explanation is one 
who has something of value taken from him. Whatever our 
views of abortion, Dworkin says, we would not tolerate a "check-
erboard" solution to the abortion controversy that would allow 
abortions for women born in odd years but not those born in 
even years,9s just because "we insist that the state act on a single, 
coherent set of principles even when its citizens are divided 
about what the right principles of justice .and fairness really 
are."99 
In Federal Courts law, by contrast, the stakes are typically 
different. Let us suppose, for the sake of exposition, that Federal 
Courts problems are governed solely by considerations of juris-
dictional policy. In that event, the contested issues are not rights 
and obligations, but the distribution of authority among institu-
tions. Whether the issue is federal district court jurisdiction, 
Supreme Court review, habeas corpus, the scope of federal com-
mon law, or abstention, the Court's task is to determine which 
judicial system will make decisions about rights and duties, not 
what the content of those substantive obligations will be. Ripe-
ness, mootness, and standing deal with the proper timing of adju-
dication and the identification of proper parties to raise 
substantive issues, not with the merits of the claims they present. 
Problems of congressional control of federal jurisdiction and the 
95. ld. at 208·15. 
96. Id. at 214. 
rn. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 546-48 
(1982)(equal treatment is a value only when substantive rights are defined as requiring it). 
98. See Dworkin, Low's Empire at 178-84 (cited in note 20). 
99. ld. at 166. 
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role of federal courts in creating remedies concern the distribu-
tion of power among the branches of the national government. 
In all of these matters, what is at stake is the implementation 
of one or another view of the conditions for effective adjudica-
tion, federal-state relations, or separation of powers among the 
branches of the national government. To the extent Federal 
Courts law addresses institutional powers and relationships, no 
one's rights and obligations are impacted by it. No "principles of 
justice and fairness" are at stake, and so there arises no need to 
justify the outcome to the loser in order to maintain the authority 
of a "genuine associative community." I submit that we would 
not be embarrassed to tell the disappointed litigant in such a ju-
risdictional dispute that he lost on account of a distinction that is 
as arbitrary as his birthdate. 
The argument advanced in the last two paragraphs is suffi-
cient to rebut the claims of coherence in some parts of Federal 
Courts law, for there are areas where jurisdictional policy is dom-
inant. It seems unlikely that most of the doctrine on the scope of 
federal question jurisdiction or the powers of "legislative 
courts" has any systematic substantive impact on the outcomes of 
litigation. It seems appropriate to have such matters governed by 
pragmatic factors rather than insisting that general principles be 
devised for them.HJO 
But the foregoing discussion is hardly sufficient to dispose of 
coherence altogether, because its premise ignores one of the 
themes of this article: Contrary to the Hart & Wechsler para-
digm, much jurisdictional law in fact has a strong substantive 
component. Litigants' rights and duties are affected by alloca-
tional rulings. Ironically, the value of coherence is stronger in 
connection with those parts of Federal Courts law that are not 
based solely on jurisdictional policy. 
Does it follow that someone who generally accepts coher-
ence as an important value must deplore its absence in those 
parts of Federal Courts law where substantive considerations 
weigh heavily in adjudication? I do not think so. There is a cru-
cial difference between judicial decisions that resolve substantive 
disputes and lay down rules for future conduct, on the one hand, 
and jurisdictional rules that assign decisionmaking power on the 
other. Despite the substantive implications of jurisdictional 
rules, that impact is oblique and uncertain. No one knows 
whether a different jurisdictional rule would have changed the 
100. See Shapiro, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 568-70 (cited in note 16); Bator, 65 Ind. LJ. at 
254-60 (cited in note 28). 
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outcome of any given case. The Supreme Court insists that there 
is really no significant disparity between federal and state courts 
anyway.101 No one can decisively prove that the Court is 
wrong.toz Complicating matters further, the degree of disparity 
varies from time to time as the makeup of the federal courts 
changes. From 1981 to 1992, for example, the influx of Republi-
can appointments to the federal courts may have narrowed the 
gap between federal and state courts, weakening the argument 
that allocation decisions have significant substantive conse-
quences. With the Democrats in power, any disparity may 
widen.to3 
In these circumstances, it is hard to make a compelling claim 
of unfairness if a litigant is denied a federal forum due to an 
arbitrary distinction in the jurisdictional law. The incoherence of 
federal courts law surely violates Dworkin's principle of integ-
rity. But there are degrees of unfairness, and the unfairness re-
sulting from arbitrary jurisdictional rules is, comparatively 
speaking, minor. The injustice done by them is too inchoate, the 
victims too hard to identify, the outcomes too difficult to predict, 
to demand coherence as a first and absolutely essential principle 
in jurisdictional law. 
Dworkin is right that Americans would recoil at the notion 
of compromising competing views on abortion by allowing per-
sons born in odd-numbered years to have abortions while deny-
ing them to women born in even-numbered years. I do not 
pretend that such a system for determining federal jurisdiction 
would be lauded by the public. But my point is a relative one, 
and the outcry over arbitrary allocation of judicial authority 
would certainly be pale in comparison to that in the personal lib-
erties context. Our comparative quiescence in the face of chronic 
incoherence merely illustrates the point. 
Also, coherence comes at a price. If coherence is, or is at 
least perceived by the United States Supreme Court to be, a 
comparatively unimportant goal in Federal Courts jurisprudence, 
flexibility is not. Drawing arbitrary or compromised lines has 
101. See, e.g., Deakins v. Monaglum, 484 U.S. 193, 203 (1988); Allen v. McCurry, 449 
U.S. 90, 105 (1980); Huffnum v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975). 
102. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal 
Judiciary, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 233 (1988). 
103. See Stephen Labaton, Clinton May Use Diversity Pledge to Remake Courts, N.Y. 
Times, At, col. 6 (March 8, 1993) (national edition) ("With a near-record number of 
vacancies on the Federal bench and the likelihood that Congress will pass a measure to 
create dozens more, President Clinton is expected to name hundreds of judges over the 
next four years and dramatically alter the judicial landscape after 12 years of Republican 
appointments."). 
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proven useful to the Court in accommodating federal and state 
interests that are difficult to reconcile in principled terms. Fed-
eral Courts law is racked with conflict. States assert essential 
interests in finality, sovereignty, procedural integrity and effi-
ciency, the determination and interpretation of their own laws, 
and the like. Federal claimants, on the other hand, laud the en-
forceability and uniformity of federal law, the sanctity of the fed-
eral forum, the superiority of life-tenured judges, and the rest. 
There is no readily apparent way to reconcile these competing 
interests by principle. Federal courts law is a battlefield. It has 
been so for 200 years. It will likely remain so for a good time to 
come. 
By drawing arbitrary lines between cases that are essentially 
alike, as with the categorizations occurring in such cases as 
Monroe v. Pape104 and Younger v. Harris,ws the Court can ac-
commodate conflicting interests without being unduly concerned 
with the sometimes awkward demands of principle.106 The re-
cent habeas cases suggest that the Court is inclined to give more 
weight to state interests in finality without abandoning the basic 
principle allowing federal relitigation of legal issues. Toward 
this end, it carves out classes of habeas petitioners and denies 
access. On occasion the Court seeks either to evade a controver-
sial issue or to address an issue with unusual dispatch. So the 
justices have manipulated justiciability standards in order to deny 
review in DeFunis v. Odegaard,1o7 and to expedite adjudication 
in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group.1os 
The Court chooses among a variety of approaches to the review 
of state court judgments, depending on whether, at a given point 
in time, it seeks to avoid unnecessary constitutional decisions or 
take an active role in refashioning constitutional law. This is our 
history-whether for liberals or conservatives, activists or advo-
cates of restraint. It is far from clear that this unwieldy process 
has served us poorly. 
The central point behind stressing the way the argument for 
coherence varies depending on context and noting the benefits of 
incoherence is not to resolve the issue of how much coherence 
should count. It is to insist that, if Federal Courts scholars are to 
grasp and portray the reality of Federal Courts law, they must 
face that normative issue instead of taking the value of coherence 
104. 365 u.s. 167 (1961). 
105. 401 u.s. 37 (1971). 
106. See Wells, 60 N.C. L. Rev. at 68-86 (cited in note 36). 
107. 416 u.s. 312 (1974). 
108. 438 u.s. 59 (1978). 
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for granted. Moreover, in addressing the normative issue they 
must not ignore the role of substance in the adjudication of juris-
dictional issues. Under the pragmatic paradigm, the value of co-
herence is particularly strong only in circumstances where Hart 
& Wechsler's normative premise favoring jurisdictional policy is 
weak.109 
Notice another consequence of the link between substance 
and coherence. Their relation means that the kind of coherence 
that may be required under the pragmatic paradigm will differ 
radically from the precepts favored by adherents of Hart & 
Wechsler. For example, if the proper scope of standing to sue is 
strictly a matter of jurisdictional policy, then in broad terms the 
debate over taxpayer standing should be about choosing between 
the principle that federal courts should be generally available to 
enforce federal law and the principle that the party seeking to 
assert standing needs to show a compelling need for judicial in-
tervention. By recognizing the substantive theme in standing 
law, courts and scholars may refocus the debate, justifying tax-
payer standing for Establishment Clause claims, while denying it 
for claims brought to enforce other constitutional provisions that 
create no personal constitutional rights.uo In a similar vein, one 
109. Once again, it is necessary to pay close attention to context. Some parts of juris-
dictional law bear more directly on substantive rights and obligations than others. Habeas 
rules that channel litigation to state courts, like the holding in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 
465 (1976), affect federal rights only to the extent federal courts would have resolved the 
issues differently. By contrast, habeas rules denying access to federal court in the event of 
procedural default in state court, see, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986), have 
the effect of denying access to any forum for litigating federal claims. The pragmatic 
paradigm holds that incoherence is less tolerable in the procedural default context than in 
determining the scope of Stone. 
Eleventh amendment rulings may determine not only whether suit may be brought in 
federal court, but whether suit may be brought at all. For it remains unclear whether state 
courts must allow plaintiffs with federal causes of action against state governments to 
bring them in state court. See McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and 
Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990). McKesson holds that state courts may not assert "equitable 
considerations" as a broad justification for refusing to order the state to refund unconsti-
tutionally collected taxes. It remains to be seen whether a different result obtains when 
the asserted justification for refusing relief is "sovereign immunity" rather than "equita-
ble considerations." See Low and Jeffries, Federal Courts at 955-56 (cited in note 29). 
Under the pragmatic paradigm, the need for coherence in eleventh amendment law 
turns on how the issue left open in McKesson is resolved. The case for coherence would 
be compelling only if states are not obliged to open their courts to federal claims against 
state governments. 
110. From a substantive perspective, then, Flost v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (recog-
nizing taxpayer standing to raise Establishment Oause challenges to congr~ional enact-
ments); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (no taxpayer standmg to.enforce 
a constitutional provision requiring that government budgets be made pubhc); and 
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (no cit~n stand-
ing to enforce constitutional provision forbidding legislative officers from holdmg ~x~­
tive offices) may all be reconciled. The dubious case, in this view of taxpayer standmg, IS 
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might argue that considerations of jurisdictional policy generally 
support the Younger abstention doctrine, but that the especially 
strong substantive value of vindicating free speech rights justifies 
an exception for litigants seeking access to federal court to raise 
first amendment challenges to state laws.111 
CONCLUSION 
It is no wonder that Federal Courts scholars are unhappy. 
Our goal should be to pierce the rhetorical surface of judicial 
opinions, grasp the reality that lies beneath, and convey it to our 
readers. The function of a model is to help us in these endeavors 
and the test of its current value is not its pedigree but how well it 
serves us today. Hart & Wechsler's model of Federal Courts law 
no longer meets our needs. It departs too much from the reality 
of the cases to work as a descriptive model, and its normative 
premises are themselves contestable, if not downright weak in 
the Federal Courts context. 
Hart & Wechsler is a casualty of thirty years of constitu-
tional combat.Hz The subtle analysis of jurisdictional policy de-
manded by Hart & Wechsler proved unable to withstand assault 
by warring state and individual interests seeking substantive ad-
vantage on a jurisdictional battlefield. As a result, there is no 
longer a coherent body of jurisdictional law based primarily on 
principles of federalism and separation of powers, if there ever 
was one. Rather, the area is rife with arbitrary distinctions and 
confused doctrine, despite the best efforts of Legal Process schol-
ars to help the Court impose order. Substantive considerations 
exercise a pervasive influence on jurisdictional doctrine, contrary 
to the Legal Process view that substantive implications should 
count only in extreme cases. What is more, the demise of the 
Hart & Wechsler paradigm is not necessarily a normative catas-
trophe. There are arguably good reasons to forego process val-
ues and jurisdictional policy in favor of more ad hoc 
decisionmaking and the pursuit of substantive goals by jurisdic-
tional means. 
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 
454 U.S. 464 (1982) (denying taxpayer standing to challenge executive actions). 
111. Legal Process scholars sometimes reach this result by other means. See, e.g., 
Martin H. Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Rationale, 
63 Cornell L. Rev. 463, 486-87 & n.l17 (1978). 
112. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, The Making of The Legal 
Process, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 2031, 2049-51 (1994) (on how the breakdown of consensus in 
the sixties and seventies "revealed the limitations of legal process philosophy for the next 
generation"). 
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Federal Courts scholars need a new paradigm for addressing 
allocational issues, one that better accounts for the Court's ac-
tions and that reflects the real differences between jurisdictional 
law and the law of primary rights and obligations. I know better 
than to presume that the pragmatic paradigm sketched in Part IV 
is the definitive answer to the torpor of contemporary Federal 
Courts scholarship. But at least it asks some of the right 
questions. 
